

Emergency Management Policy

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1 Glossary of abbreviations and terms

Act	Electricity Industry Act 2010
AUFLS	Automatic under-frequency load shedding
Authority	The Electricity Authority established in accordance with the Act
Conservation Campaign	A campaign to encourage voluntary reductions in demand through public communications
Developing Event	Event that evolves over time, e.g. as the result of a period of unseasonably low inflows to hydro catchments
Immediate Event	Event that occurs with little or no warning, e.g. as a result of a transmission or major power station failure
Code	The Electricity Industry Participation Code administered by the Authority
Emergency Storage Guideline	Storage reference curve that corresponds to a 10% risk of electricity shortages
EMP	The Emergency Management Policy, prepared and published under clause 7.3(3)(a) of the Code
Hydro Risk Curves	The profile of New Zealand or South Island hydro storage over a calendar year that represents levels of risk of future electricity shortages identified by the system operator in accordance with the security of supply forecasting and information policy
POPs	Participant rolling outage plans published by specified participants under Part 9 of the Code
PPOs	The system operator's principle performance obligations
Security Alert	Declaration by the system operator that a Security Alert Phase has commenced
Security Alert Phase	Phase in which the risk of shortage is deemed to be between 4% and 10%
Security Emergency	Declaration by the system operator that a Security Emergency Phase has commenced
Security Emergency Phase	Phase in which the risk of shortage is deemed to be at least 10%
Security Normal Phase	Phase in which the risk of immediate shortage is deemed to be small
Security Watch	Declaration by the system operator that a Security Watch Phase has commenced

Security Watch Phase Phase in which the risk of shortage is deemed to be between 1% and 4%

Security of Supply Forecasting and Information Policy The policy prepared and published under clause 7.3(1)(a) of the Code

Any term that is defined in the Act or the Code and used but not defined in this Policy has the same meaning as in the Act or the Code.

2 Introduction

2.1 Background

2.1.1 Historically the former Electricity Commission published an emergency response plan that set out how it intended to manage emergencies of a longer term nature. Following the Ministerial Review of the electricity sector in 2009, Government transferred this responsibility to Transpower, as system operator. This Emergency Management Policy (EMP) replaces the Electricity Commission's emergency response plan. To provide continuity and facilitate ongoing development of such arrangements the system operator has, in the first instance, adopted similar policies to manage supply emergencies to those previously employed by the Electricity Commission.

2.2 Emergency Management Requirements

2.2.1 The Act requires the system operator to manage supply emergencies. The system operator's role will therefore include managing emergencies arising from the shortfall or anticipated shortfall of generation, transmission, or ancillary services to meet demand through the secure dispatch of the power system.

2.2.2 The primary means of managing the risk of emergencies are the incentives on participants that stem from the market design. However, the Code anticipates the potential for infrequent situations to arise which are appropriately managed through greater central coordination.

2.2.3 The Code sets out the responsibilities of the system operator in relation to security of supply in the following five ways:

- a) through the requirement for the system operator to develop a security of supply forecasting and information policy¹ that includes a requirement for the system operator to prepare and publish:
 - i) at least annually a security of supply assessment; and
 - ii) information that assists interested parties to monitor how hydro and thermal generating capacity, transmission assets, primary fuel, and ancillary services are being utilised to manage risks of shortages (clause 7.3(1)(a) of the Code);
- b) through the specification of the PPOs under Part 7 of the Code, and the requirement for the associated policy statement that sets out how the system operator will meet its PPOs (Part 8 of the Code);
- c) through the emergency technical code that sets out the basis on which the system operator and participants will anticipate and respond to emergency events on the national grid (grid), which are typically of a short term nature, (Technical Code B of Schedule 8.3 of the Code);
- d) through the requirement for the system operator to develop an emergency management policy (this policy) which sets out the steps that the system operator must take, and encourage participants to take, at various stages during an extended emergency such as an extended dry sequence or an extended period of capacity inadequacy (clause 7.3(3)(a) of the Code); and
- e) through the requirement for the system operator to manage and coordinate planned outages as an emergency measure in anticipation of, or during, energy shortages (Part 9 of the Code).

¹ [insert electronic link to policy]

2.3 Emergency Management Policy Scope

- 2.3.1 This EMP is prepared under clause 7.3(3)(a) of the Code. The EMP is required to set out the steps that the system operator must take, and encourage participants to take, at various stages during an extended emergency such as an extended dry sequence or an extended period of capacity inadequacy. Examples of capacity inadequacy include generation, transmission or ancillary service inadequacy.
- 2.3.2 This EMP provides for a series of last resort emergency measures, that the system operator must implement if there is a significant risk that demand for electricity will not be able to be met on a sustained basis.
- 2.3.3 As this EMP cannot anticipate all possible situations and feasible actions relating to security of supply emergencies, the system operator may depart from the policies set out in this EMP in the event that an extended emergency situation² arises and such a departure is required in terms of the system operator acting as a reasonable and prudent system operator.
- 2.3.4 This EMP also sets out explanatory material about the EMP's relationship and interaction with other relevant Code requirements in the context of emergency planning (as set out in paragraph 2.2.3 above).
- 2.3.5 In preparing the EMP and implementing the steps set out in the EMP (when required), the system operator must:
- act as a reasonable and prudent system operator;
 - plan, take steps and encourage participants to take steps during an extended emergency in a manner consistent with the Code;
 - trigger and manage emergency conservation campaigns to lower the risk of supply shortages; and
 - implement rolling outages in accordance with the Code.
- 2.3.6 The EMP explicitly provides for an extended emergency such as an extended dry sequence or an extended period of capacity inadequacy. In time the EMP will be developed further to include steps that the system operator must take and encourage participants to take in conjunction with:
- the relevant gas industry operators at various stages during a gas transmission or supply failure to generators; and
 - asset owners during civil emergencies (including those arising from loss of power supply).
- 2.3.7 This EMP is intended to cover events affecting the grid and grid-connected generation. This EMP does not cover events occurring on distribution networks (including embedded networks), within consumer premises, or on networks not connected to the grid.

2.4 The Role of Participants

- 2.4.1 While the EMP sets out the steps that the system operator must take in an emergency situation, prudent management of an emergency situation is dependent on the collective response of participants to the situation. Therefore, in

² An extended emergency situation is defined as meaning any situation in which the system operator believes on reasonable grounds that complying with the EMP will not:

- adequately mitigate an emergency situation; or
- minimise risk to public safety or significant damage to assets.

addition to the steps that the system operator must take in accordance with its obligations under the Code, the EMP also sets out the steps that the system operator must encourage participants to take at various stages during an extended emergency. It is important to note that, while the system operator must encourage participants to take certain steps, the system operator has no ability to insist participants take steps set out in the EMP. This contrasts with participant obligations under the grid emergency provisions under Part 8 of the Code.

2.4.2 In general, the system operator considers that most types of measures to manage security of supply are best implemented by participants. Further, in a well-designed market, participants should face appropriate incentives to support security of supply. Accordingly, this policy limits the role of the system operator during a shortage situation to:

- a) providing information; and
- b) fulfilling its role as prescribed by the Code, including this policy.

2.5 No Demand Buyback or Energy Procurement

2.5.1 For the avoidance of doubt, this EMP excludes the buyback of demand by the system operator and the procurement of energy by the system operator, as neither of these options is incorporated in the Code.

2.6 No Compensation of Participants

2.6.1 For the avoidance of doubt, the system operator will not pay compensation to any person taking actions to manage an extended emergency, whether at the request of the system operator, or of that person's own volition. The Code does not contain any provision for compensation to be paid.

2.7 No Link to Whirinaki Offer Strategy

2.7.1 For the avoidance of doubt, the system operator does not control the price or quantity at which the Whirinaki generating station is offered into the market – this is the responsibility of the Authority.³

³ Current Whirinaki offer instruction (1 March 2010)

3 Interaction with Other Emergency Response Requirements and Events

3.1 Interaction with other Code Requirements

3.1.1 The relationship and interaction between this policy and other specific Code requirements and processes in the context of emergency planning are set out below.

3.2 Security of Supply Forecasting and Information Policy

3.2.1 The system operator's approach to emergency management places an emphasis on providing good quality information on security of supply risks and maximising the opportunity for participants to respond to, and manage their exposure to, security of supply risks.

3.2.2 The system operator's security of supply forecasting and information policy will set out how the system operator intends to provide such information. Under the security of supply forecasting and information policy, the system operator must prepare and publish:

- a) an annual security of supply assessment that contains detailed supply and demand forecasts for at least 5 years that assists interested parties to assess whether the energy security of supply standard and the capacity security of supply standard are likely to be met; and
- b) information that assists interested parties to monitor how hydro and thermal generating capacity, transmission assets, primary fuel, and ancillary services are being utilised to manage risks of shortage, including extended dry periods.

3.2.3 In respect of (b) above, one of the key items of information that the system operator will be required to prepare and publish under the security of supply forecasting and information policy is Hydro Risk Curves. The Hydro Risk Curves will reflect the system operator's view of the risk of future electricity shortages taking into account the range of likely inflows to hydro catchments. The Hydro Risk Curves are utilised by the system operator in determining when to initiate emergency measures set out in this EMP. The methodology that the system operator must adopt in determining the Hydro Risk Curves is set out in the security of supply forecasting and information policy.

3.3 Other Events

3.3.1 The types of events that are likely to require the implementation of the provisions of this EMP include an extended period of extremely low inflows to hydro catchments, a major asset outage that is expected to be sustained for a long period, or some combination of those events. There are, however, other events such as short-term grid emergencies and civil defence emergencies that are managed under other Code requirements or processes rather than a direct application of this EMP. These are detailed below.

Grid Emergencies

3.3.2 Grid emergencies are managed pursuant to Technical Code B of Schedule 8.3 of the Code. In simplified terms, a grid emergency occurs when the system operator's ability to comply with its PPOs is compromised, and urgent action is required of the system operator and/or participants to alleviate the situation. The

PPOs include an obligation to avoid cascade failure and to maintain frequency quality.

- 3.3.3 The policy statement under Part 8 of the Code requires the system operator to issue a grid emergency notice to relevant participants whenever the ability of the system operator to comply with the PPOs is at risk or is compromised. The notice must specify the trading periods to which it applies.
- 3.3.4 In the event of a grid emergency (e.g. insufficient generation and frequency regulating reserve, or insufficient transmission capacity), the system operator can invite generators to vary their offer or retailers to reduce demand, or request distributors to reduce or disconnect demand and/or take any other reasonable action to alleviate the grid emergency. Each North Island distributor, and in the South Island each Grid Owner, is required to maintain an automatic under frequency load shedding (AUFLS) system to enable automatic disconnection of two blocks of demand when the frequency falls to predefined levels.
- 3.3.5 These grid emergency provisions are intended to cover short-term emergency situations that typically occur as a result of system contingencies such as a loss of a transmission line or a major source of generation.
- 3.3.6 This EMP does not cover grid emergency situations, although it is possible that emergency measures included in this EMP may be required following a grid emergency.

Civil Defence Emergencies

- 3.3.7 Lifeline utilities (including lines companies and generators) have direct responsibility under section 60 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 to ensure that they are able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced level, during and after a civil defence emergency.
- 3.3.8 Civil defence emergencies could have impacts on both supply and demand. In the event that a civil defence emergency impacts within cities and towns it is likely that demand for electricity will fall and the focus will be on restoring supply to critical consumers, rather than managing limited supply using the emergency measures included in this EMP. Most civil defence emergencies are likely to be of this nature.
- 3.3.9 In the event that a civil defence emergency impacts on power stations and there is insufficient supply to meet consumer demand, the emergency measures included in this EMP may be required.
- 3.3.10 To the extent that a natural disaster produces circumstances covered by this EMP, the system operator must act in accordance with this EMP.

4 Emergency Events

4.1 Types of Event


4.1.1 There is a spectrum of extended events that could lead the system operator to determine that emergency measures are required. Two categories of events that typify the ends of the spectrum are:

Developing Events – Events that evolve over time – for example as the result of a period of unseasonably low inflows to hydro catchments; and

Immediate Events – Events that occur with little or no warning – for example as a result of a transmission or major power station failure, the impact of which are expected to extend over a period of weeks rather than days.

4.1.2 These types of events are illustrated in the following figure, which contrasts the two categories of event and the likely sequence of storage.

Figure 1: Types of events



- 4.1.3 The emergency measures set out in this EMP are intended to be appropriate for a spectrum of extended emergency events. In practice, a security of supply emergency could have elements of both types of events.

4.2 Developing Events

- 4.2.1 The first example illustrated in Figure 2 is for a Developing Event that involves low inflows to hydro catchments resulting in storage falling through the Hydro Risk Curves⁴ and ultimately below the Emergency Storage Guideline.
- 4.2.2 This illustrates how a dry-year emergency would take some time to unfold, with opportunities to manage security of supply risks and prepare emergency measures during the early part of the event.

4.3 Immediate Events

- 4.3.1 The second example illustrated in Figure 2 is an Immediate Event, such as a sudden and long term failure of a major thermal generator. Such a failure may require immediate action in order to balance supply and demand. The instantaneous failure of generation may require the system operator to respond in real-time in accordance with the Grid Emergency provisions under Part 8 of the Code.
- 4.3.2 If a major outage is expected to be of significant duration, the system operator must:
- a) promptly re-evaluate the Hydro Risk Curves and the Emergency Storage Guideline; and
 - b) if the Emergency Storage Guideline rises to a position above the level of hydro storage, implement the emergency measures identified in this policy, including if necessary rolling outages in accordance with Part 9 of the Code.
- 4.3.3 If emergency measures are needed at short notice, unlike a Developing Event, little time will be available to prepare and implement emergency measures.
- 4.3.4 If emergency measures are needed at short notice, the system operator must in the first instance implement those emergency measures that are feasible and immediately available.


⁴ It is assumed that any restriction in available thermal fuel would be known and factored into the derivation of the hydro risk curves.

5 Monitoring

5.1 Monitoring Hydro Storage

- 5.1.1 The system operator must monitor security of supply on an ongoing basis. Under the security of supply forecasting and information policy, the system operator is required to prepare and publish a regular report that includes a comparison of storage in the hydro lakes with the Hydro Risk Curves indicating the risk of possible future shortages of supply. This will provide participants with an opportunity to consider the system operator’s analysis and respond to security of supply risks as they arise.
- 5.1.2 The Hydro Risk Curves reflect the risk of future electricity shortages taking into account the range of likely inflows to hydro catchments, and are required to be updated whenever there is a change in supply, demand, or transmission that is likely to yield a material change to the curves (for example a change in thermal or HVDC transmission availability).
- 5.1.3 As part of the transition to the Code the system operator has retained the former Electricity Commission’s emergency management planning phases of Security Normal, Security Watch, Security Alert, and Security Emergency. These phases are bounded by three of the Hydro Risk Curves as illustrated in Figure 2: Phases of Emergency Management.

Figure 2: Phases of Emergency Management



5.2 Transition between Security of Supply Phases

- 5.2.1 The transitions between security of supply phases illustrated in Figure 3 are summarised in the following table.


Transition	Phase
When hydro storage falls below the 1% Hydro Risk Curve; or when an Immediate Event has occurred which, in the system operator’s view, gives rise to a 1% risk of shortage	Security Normal to Security Watch

Transition	Phase
When hydro storage falls below the 4% Hydro Risk Curve; or when an Immediate Event has occurred which, in the system operator's view, gives rise to a 4% risk of shortage	Security Watch to Security Alert
When hydro storage falls below the Emergency Storage Guideline (10% Hydro Risk Curve); or when an Immediate Event has occurred which, in the system operator's view, gives rise to a 10% risk of shortage	Security Alert to Security Emergency ⁵
When hydro storage rises above the Emergency Storage Guideline (10% Hydro Risk Curve); or when the Immediate Event that has occurred is mitigated so that the risk of shortage is less than 10%	Security Emergency to Security Alert
When hydro storage rises above the 4% Hydro Risk Curve; or when the Immediate Event that has occurred is mitigated so that the risk of shortage is less than 4%	Security Alert to Security Watch
When hydro storage rises above the 1% Hydro Risk Curve; or when the Immediate Event that has occurred is mitigated so that the risk of shortage is less than 1%	Security Watch to Security Normal

5.3 Risk Meter

- 5.3.1 The system operator must publish on its website a Riskmeter that indicates the current security of supply situation expressed as Security Normal, Security Watch, Security Alert, or Security Emergency. An example of a Riskmeter appears in Figure 3: Riskmeter.

Figure 3: Riskmeter



- 5.3.2 Under some hydraulic conditions the risk in all of the major catchments, or regions of New Zealand, may not be the same. For example, at times the risk of energy shortages may be limited to the South Island, as a result of constraints on the inter-island HVDC transmission link.
- 5.3.3 In accordance with the security of supply forecasting and information policy, if the security of supply situation is not the same in all regions of New Zealand, the system operator must publish a separate Riskmeter for each region that has a different level of risk of electricity shortage.

⁵ It is possible that, during an Immediate Event, the transition could be from Security Normal direct to Security Emergency.

6 Staged Approach to Management of Extended Emergencies

6.1 Security Normal

- 6.1.1 During Security Normal, the system operator must:
- a) assess the risks of electricity shortage; and
 - b) publish information about the risks of electricity shortage.
- 6.1.2 The system operator is required to publish regular security of supply assessments as outlined in the security of supply forecasting and information policy.
- 6.1.3 If an Immediate Event occurs, the system operator must re-evaluate the Hydro Risk Curves and determine whether the event has caused a transition to a Security Watch, Security Alert or Security Emergency phase. If the system operator considers it necessary, the system operator must coordinate immediate demand reductions in accordance with the grid emergency provisions under Part 8 of the Code.

6.2 Security Watch

- 6.2.1 During the Security Watch phase, the system operator must:
- a) monitor security of supply risks more closely than during the Security Normal phase;
 - b) communicate the elevated level of risk to stakeholders;
 - c) ensure that any public messages about the security of supply risks are low key and focus on the slight elevation of security of supply risks; and
 - d) monitor whether generation is operating in a manner that is consistent with the assumption that generation will operate to conserve hydro storage in at-risk areas whenever storage falls below the 1% Hydro Risk Curve. If this is not happening, the system operator must investigate why generation is not operating to conserve hydro storage in at-risk areas.

6.3 Security Alert

- 6.3.1 During a Security Alert phase, the system operator must:
- a) monitor security of supply risks more closely than during the Security Watch phase;
 - b) update and publish assessments of security of supply risk more frequently than during the Security Watch phase;
 - c) establish industry participant groups to co-ordinate industry initiatives and identify feasible emergency measures;
 - d) ensure that participants have the information necessary to understand asset availability, thermal fuel availability, hydro storage levels, and transmission constraints;
 - e) ensure that participants have the information necessary to understand the benefit and opportunity of demand response at a wholesale level;
 - f) prepare feasible emergency measures that the system operator must implement during a Security Emergency phase; and
 - g) communicate feasible emergency measures and system operator requirements to participants.

6.4 Security Emergency

- 6.4.1 During a Security Emergency phase, the system operator must:
- communicate security of supply risks and the sequence of emergency measures that the system operator intends to implement;
 - ensure that participants have the information necessary to understand asset availability, thermal fuel availability, hydro storage levels, and transmission constraints;
 - ensure that participants have the information necessary to understand the benefit and opportunity of demand response at a wholesale level; and
 - work with the industry to initiate emergency measures as necessary.

6.5 Summary of Phases

- 6.5.1 The following table summarises the steps that the system operator must take and encourage participants to take prior to and during an extended emergency situation:

Phase	System Operator	Participants
All phases	Schedule and dispatch system Must meet PPOs and the dispatch objective	Operate in accordance with the Code Monitor and manage security of supply risks on a commercial basis
Security Normal	Monitor and publish assessments of security of supply risks	
Security Watch	Monitor more closely, and publish assessments of security of supply risks more frequently if, in the system operator's view, this is appropriate	
Security Alert	<p>Monitor security of supply risks more closely and publish assessments of security of supply risk more frequently</p> <p>Establish industry participant groups</p> <p>Ensure participants have the information necessary to understand asset availability, thermal fuel availability, hydro storage levels and transmission constraints</p> <p>Ensure participants have the information necessary to understand the benefit and opportunity of demand response at a wholesale level</p> <p>Prepare feasible emergency measures</p> <p>Communicate feasible emergency measures and system operator requirements to participants</p>	<p>As applicable:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - maximise asset availability - maximise thermal fuel availability - minimise hydro generation <p>Ensure the benefit and opportunities of demand response at a retail level are understood by consumers</p> <p>Coordinate with other participants as appropriate</p> <p>Communicate with stakeholders</p> <p>Prepare for identified emergency measures.</p>

Phase	System Operator	Participants
Security Emergency	<p>Communicate security of supply risks and the sequence of emergency measures that the system operator intends to implement</p> <p>Ensure participants have the information necessary to understand asset availability, thermal fuel availability, hydro storage levels and transmission constraints</p> <p>Ensure participants have the information necessary to understand the benefit and opportunity of demand response at a wholesale level</p> <p>Initiate emergency measures as necessary</p>	<p>As applicable:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - maximise asset availability - maximise thermal fuel availability - minimise hydro generation <p>Ensure the benefit and opportunity of demand response at a retail level are understood by consumers</p> <p>Implement and participate in emergency responses as appropriate</p> <p>Coordinate with other participants as appropriate</p> <p>Communicate with stakeholders</p>

7 Emergency Measures

7.1 Introduction

- 7.1.1 The system operator must implement emergency measures if it considers that industry participants' choices are likely to lead to uncoordinated energy shortages.
- 7.1.2 This EMP includes a limited range of emergency measures to be initiated by the system operator during a security of supply emergency, consistent with the expectation that the market design provides adequate incentive for industry participants to manage security of supply risks.
- 7.1.3 This EMP includes the emergency measures summarised in the following table:

Emergency Measure	Preparation of Emergency Measure to be triggered	Emergency Measure to be triggered
Public Conservation Campaign	If industry participants are not in the process of preparing a campaign and a Security Alert is declared; or If industry participants are not about to commence a campaign or have not successfully implemented an adequate campaign, and the system operator considers that it is more likely than not that a Security Emergency will occur.	When a Security Emergency is declared, if industry participants are not about to commence a campaign or have not successfully implemented an adequate campaign, and after consultation with the Authority.
Rolling Outages	The system operator must provide 'specified participants' with at least two weeks' notice that rolling outages may be required (if possible), in accordance with part 9 of the Code and the system operator rolling outage plan.	If hydro storage falls to or below a level at which, in the system operator's view, it is more likely than not that shortages will occur; or
	If the need for rolling outages is triggered by an Immediate Event, the system operator will provide as much notice as possible, consistent with the need to put measures in place.	When an Immediate Event has occurred which, in the system operator's view creates a situation such that it is more likely than not that shortages will occur.

7.2 Emergency Conservation Campaign

- 7.2.1 A conservation campaign involves encouraging voluntary reductions in demand through public communications.
- 7.2.2 To date conservation campaigns have been initiated through a collective approach organised and funded by industry participants, and implemented before storage falls below the Emergency Storage Guideline.
- 7.2.3 The system operator must commence preparations for an emergency conservation campaign if:
- a Security Alert has been declared and industry participants are not in the process of preparing a campaign; or
 - the system operator considers that it is more likely than not that a Security Emergency will occur, and industry participants are not about to commence a

campaign or have not successfully implemented a campaign across all relevant customers.

- 7.2.4 If a Security Emergency occurs and participants are not about to commence a campaign or have not successfully implemented a conservation campaign across all relevant customers, the system operator must, after consultation with the Authority:
- a) implement its conservation campaign; or
 - b) collaborate with industry participants to prepare and implement a conservation campaign as quickly as possible.

Note: Paragraph 7.2.4 is most likely to apply if the Security Emergency is the result of an Immediate Event.

7.3 Rolling Outages

- 7.3.1 Rolling outages involve the system operator instructing distributors and selected direct connect consumers to cut load to meet savings targets. The system operator may direct specified participants to implement outages to achieve reductions in the consumption of electricity under Part 9 of the Code.
- 7.3.2 Rolling outages are intended as the last resort emergency measure and will only be implemented if other measures have failed.
- 7.3.3 The Code requires the system operator to prepare and publish a system operator rolling outage plan outlining how it intends to implement rolling outages, and designating participants (such as distributors and direct connect consumers) that are required to prepare participant rolling outage plans.
- 7.3.4 In accordance with the Code the system operator must direct specified participants to implement rolling outages as the last resort emergency measure, during a Security Emergency, when the system operator considers that it is **more likely than not** that a sustained period of forced outages under grid emergency provisions⁶ would be required in the absence of rolling outages.

⁶ Under Technical Code B of Schedule 8.3 of the Code.

8 Emergency Response – Communication and Co-ordination

- 8.1.1 Transpower's CEO, or designate, is responsible for national media communications and briefings to stakeholders on behalf of the system operator.
- 8.1.2 The system operator must:
 - a) establish representative industry participant groups to assist in the coordination of communications, gathering and dissemination of information, and co-ordination of resources to mitigate the impact of the extended emergency; and
 - b) ensure that its website provides public information on the security of supply situation, and that questions from the public are answered (to the extent possible).
- 8.1.3 If the system operator develops and initiates an emergency conservation campaign, the system operator must seek assistance from the appropriate participant group(s) to develop and implement the campaign including the development and implementation of the associated communication plan.