

## Settlement residual allocation methodology (SRAM)

Information session

29 August 2022



### Introduction

- Purpose
- Presenters
- Protocols







#### Part One – Overview


- 1. What is SRAM?
- 2. SRAM principles
- 3. Our SRAM proposal
- 4. Pass-through
- 5. Impacts of the proposal
- 6. Timeline

- 1. Settlement residue
- 2. Usage signals
- 3. Investment signals





### 1. What is SRAM?














### 1. What is SRAM?





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### 2. SRAM principles

**100%** Reduce **over-payment** for transmission



Don't undermine grid usage signals



Promote competition in, reliable supply by, and the efficient operation of, the electricity industry for the long-term benefit of consumers



Don't undermine **investment** signals

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


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Don't undermine **grid usage** signals

Don't undermine investment signals










### 2. SRAM principles: don't undermine usage signals



#### Don't undermine grid usage signals

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Don't undermine investment signals



Nodal prices efficiently coordinate grid usage.

The transmission link supplying B is congested:


- using another unit of energy at B will cost \$200
- producing another unit of energy at B will earn \$200

...plus or minus any change in rebate





# 2. SRAM principles: don't undermine investment signals



100% Reduce over-payment for transmission



Don't undermine grid usage signals

Don't undermine **investment** signals

Nodal prices and transmission charges efficiently coordinate investment.

If Transpower upgrades the link to B, then the nodal price will come down...

...and users at B will be allocated the cost of the upgrade based on their benefit...

...which is smaller if they were shielded by rebates.



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### 3. Our proposal

Note: WEM = wholesale electricity market

- Proposed Simple BB
- 1. Connection LCE allocation unchanged
- 2. All other LCE allocated similarly based on 'simple method' regions and allocators from the new transmission pricing methodology

Alternative – TPM charges

- 1. All LCE allocated in proportion to transmission charges
- Rejected WEM volume
- 1. All LCE allocated in proportion to purchase volumes






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### 3. Our proposal: Simple BB

Simple BB method uses the same regions and allocators as the TPM "simple method"

Regions and allocators are based on historical flows and are updated 5-yearly – they're designed to be reasonably fixed.



Region ID	Region Description			
NLD_HV	Northland high voltage			
UNI_HV	Upper North Island high voltage			
LNI_HV	Lower North Island high voltage			
HB_HV	Hawke's Bay high voltage			
LSI_HV	Lower South Island high voltage			
CSI_HV	Central South Island high voltage			
USI_HV	Upper South Island high voltage			
HVDC	HVDC link			
NLD_LV	Northland low voltage			
UNI_LV	Upper North Island low voltage			
WTO_LV	Waikato low voltage			
CNI_LV	Central North Island low voltage			
WTN_LV	Wellington low voltage			
HB_LV	Hawke's Bay low voltage			
BOP_LV	Bay of Plenty low voltage			
SLD_LV	Southland low voltage			
CML_LV	Cromwell low voltage			
WTK_LV	Waitaki low voltage			
TIM_LV	Timaru low voltage			
USI_LV	Upper South Island low voltage			
NMB_LV	Nelson-Marlborough low voltage			














### 3. Our proposal: Simple BB


















3. Our proposal: Simple BB – usage signals



grid usage signals










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### 3. Our proposal: Simple BB – investment signals












### 3. Our proposal: Simple BB - overpaying
















### 3. Our proposal: alternative – TPM charges










### 3. Our proposal: rejected – WEM volume



Increasing usage increases rebate, undermining nodal price signals





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
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4. Settlement residue pass-through





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



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### 5. Impacts of the proposal

- overpayment addressed
- locational price risk • reduced
- nodal price signals • preserved
- investment signals ulletpreserved
- relatively simple to ٠ implement











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- 6. Timeline: Consulting now on settings from April 2023



### **Consultation**

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- Simple BB is Authority's preferred option, remain open to TPM charges option
- Code amendment drafting presented for both
- Proposing disclosure of pass-through methodology and outcome
- Proposing non-prescriptive obligation to pass-through

Next steps:

- Submissions due 27 September
- decision and code amendment
- Transpower implements SRAM
- SRAM applied to April 2023 LCE (settled in May)





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### Agenda

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
### Settlement residue comprises LCE and FTR revenue

FTRs are auctioned, generating auction revenue.

LCE tops-up auction revenue if needed.

FTR excess contributes to settlement residue.


The Authority recently consulted on FTR market observations, and is working through submissions.








### LCE comes from the transport component of nodal prices







### LCE is a cost for load and generation



### SRAM and TPM are part of a package of changes (1)

Key:

New TPM = impact of change in TPM New SRAM = impact of change in SRAM



Current = TPM charges less residue rebates, with current TPM and SRAM

Indicative = TPM charges less residue rebates, with new TPM and SRAM

South Island Generators

North Island Generators









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### SRAM and TPM are part of a package of changes (2)









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### Usage signals

Signal preserved if rebate fixed with respect to usage...

...even though costs may become less volatile.

Simple BB option uses fixed allocators, based on historical flows

Flow across congested link	500	MWh			
Price separation across congested link	\$50	per MWh			
LCE pool	\$25,000		<- price difference X flow		
User's rebate allocation	2%				
Nodal transport price	\$25	per MWh			
Nodal energy price	\$100	per MWh			
Nodal price	\$125	per MWh	<- transport + energy		
User's offtake	50	MWh			
User's transport cost	\$1,250		<- nodal transport price X offtake		
User's rebate	-\$500		<- allocation X LCE pool		
User's energy cost	\$5,000		<- nodal energy price X offtake		
User's total cost	\$5,750		<- net transport + energy		

User's new offtake	51	MWh		
User's transport cost	\$1,275		<- nodal transport price X offtak	
Users's rebate	-\$500		<- allocation X LCE pool	
User's energy cost	\$5,100			
User's total cost	\$5,875			
Increase in cost	\$125			
Increase in offtake	1	MWh		
Price signal	\$125	per MWh	- nodal price signal preserved	
















### WEM options alter signal







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
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### **Investment signalling**


Nodal prices, transmission charges, and settlement residue rebates have linked investment coordination roles






### Nodal prices and BBCs coordinate investment

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### Simple BB shields historical usage, not growth







### SRAM can influence investment signals

WEM volume option **TPM charges** option Simple BB option

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- Large purchasers (GWh) shielded
- Under-weight impact on transmission investment
- Upgrade costs fall on others
- Large TPM customers shielded from transport component of nodal prices
- Under-weight impact on transmission investment
- Upgrade costs fall on others
- Historical usage level shielded, new usage exposed
- Factor upgrades costs into decision-making
- Bear proportionate share of upgrade costs



### Summary

