Electricity Industry Participation Code 2010

This Part relates to common quality. In particular, this Part concerns the performance obligations of the system operator, the performance obligations of asset owners, arrangements concerning ancillary services, and technical codes.

• (1) For the purposes of this Part, the owner or operator of an energy storage system with a capacity equal to or greater than the threshold in clause 8.21(1), in relation to that energy storage system, is required to comply only with the obligations under this Part that apply to a generator or embedded generator, regardless of whether the energy storage system is discharging or charging.
• (2) For the avoidance of doubt, the thresholds in clauses 8.21(1) and 8.21(2) apply to an energy storage system as if the energy storage system is a generator.

• This subpart provides for―
  • (a) general performance obligations of the system operator
  • (b) a policy statement relating to the principal performance obligations of the system operator; and
  • (c) the review of the policy statement.

• (1) If the system operator is able to establish who is causing any departure from the standards referred to in clause 7.2(D), the system operator must endeavour to recover its reasonable identification and testing costs from that person. If the causer is a participant, the participant must pay those costs to the system operator.
• (2) If the system operator is unable to recover its reasonable identification and testing costs, or the causer is not able to be identified, then those costs will form part of the system operator’s identification costs.

• For the purposes of this Code, the system operator may—
  • (a) rely on the assets and information about the assets made available to the system operator by asset owners; and
  • (b) assume that asset owners are complying with the asset owner performance obligations and the technical codes, or complying with a valid dispensation or equivalence arrangement
  • (c) [Revoked]

• (1) If an event disrupts the system operator’s ability to comply with the principal performance obligations, the system operator must re-establish normal operation of the power system as soon as possible, given—
  • (a) the capability of generation, and ancillary services; and
  • (b) the configuration and capacity of the grid; and
  • (c) the information made available by asset owners.
• (2) When re-establishing normal operation of the power system under subclause (1), the system operator must have regard to the following priorities:
  • (a) first, the safety of natural persons:
  • (b) second, the avoidance of damage to assets:
  • (c) third, the restoration of offtake:
  • (d) fourth, conformance with the principal performance obligations:
  • (e) fifth, full conformance with the dispatch objective.

Subject to clause 17.29, nothing in this Code prevents the system operator from entering into contracts or arrangements in which levels of quality more stringent than those specified in the principal performance obligations are agreed, if the system operator can identify the incremental costs of those more stringent levels, and can ensure that those incremental costs are paid to the system operator by the persons wishing to enter into that contract or arrangement with the system operator.

• Subject to clauses 8.6 and 17.29, the system operator must not enter into a contract with another person that is inconsistent with the system operator’s obligations under this Code and the technical codes.

• Subject to clause 8.14, the system operator must comply with the policy statement.

• (1) The policy statement is incorporated by reference in this Code.
• (2) Clauses 7.13 to 7.22 apply to any amendment or replacement of the policy statement.

• (1) [Revoked]
• (2) [Revoked]
• (3) A policy statement must include―
  • (a) the policies and means that the system operator considers appropriate for the system operator to observe in complying with its principal performance obligations; and
  • (b) the policies and means by which scheduling and dispatch are adjusted to meet the dispatch objective, and must include the provision of a dispatch process statement. The dispatch process statement must contain the details of the processes that enable the system operator to meet the dispatch objective, including the methodologies to be used by the system operator for planning to meet the dispatch objective during the period leading up to real time and meeting the dispatch objective in real time; and
  • (c) a policy setting out how the system operator will manage any conflict of interest that arises in the performance of its obligations under this Code; and
  • (d) a statement of the reasons for adopting the policies and means set out in the policy statement (which statement must be regarded as an explanatory note only and does not form part of the policies itself); and
  • (e) a statement of how future policies and means might be formulated and implemented.

• (1) The system operator may depart from the policies set out in a policy statement when a system security situation arises and such departure is required for the system operator to comply with clause 7.1A(1).
• (2) If the system operator departs from a policy statement under subclause (1), the system operator must provide a report to the Authority setting out the circumstances of the system security situation and the actions taken to deal with it.
• (3) The Authority must publish the report within a reasonable time after receiving it.

• (1) Every 2 years, the system operator must prepare, publish, and provide to the Authority a system security forecast.
• (1A) The system security forecast must—
  • (a) identify risks to the system operator’s ability to meet the principal performance obligations over the ensuing period of not less than 36 months, and indicate how those risks can be managed; and
  • (b) take into account the capabilities of the grid and connected assets based on information known to, and able to be disclosed by, the system operator.
• (2) The date by which the system operator must publish the system security forecast and provide it to the Authority in each year in which the system operator is required to do so, is the date established for that purpose under rule 15 of section II of part C of the rules.
• (3) The system operator must review the most recent system security forecast prepared in accordance with subclause (1) at 6 monthly intervals until a new forecast or update is prepared. If, in the reasonable opinion of the system operator, a change has been made to the power system that would materially affect the most recent forecast or update, the system operator must amend the system security forecast, publish it and provide it to the Authority.

• This subpart provides for―
  • (a) the establishment of performance obligations and technical standards for asset owners to assist the system operator in complying with the principal performance obligations; and
  • (b) asset owners to obtain an assessment of their assets from the system operator; and
  • (c) a process for the system operator to approve applications for equivalence arrangements and dispensations (if necessary).

• Each generator (while synchronised) and the HVDC owner must at all times ensure that its assets, other than any generating units within an excluded generating station, make the maximum possible injection contribution to maintain frequency within the normal band (and to restore frequency to the normal band). Any such contribution must be assessed against the technical codes.

• Each purchaser must limit the magnitude of any instantaneous change in the offtake of electricity and net rate of change in offtake to the levels the system operator reasonably requires. In setting those requirements, the system operator must have regard to the impact of the offtake on the system operator’s ability to comply with the principal performance obligations concerning frequency (as set out in clauses 7.2A and 7.2B) and the dispatch objective.

• (1) Subject to subclause (3), each generator must at all times ensure that, while electrically connected, its assets, other than any excluded generating stations, contribute to supporting frequency by remaining synchronised, ensuring that each of its generating units can and does, at a minimum, sustain pre-event output―
  • (a) at all times when the frequency is above 47.5 Hertz; and
  • (b) for at least 120 seconds when the frequency is 47.5 Hertz; and
  • (c) for at least 20 seconds when the frequency is 47.3 Hertz; and
  • (d) for at least 5 seconds when the frequency is 47.1 Hertz; and
  • (e) for at least 0.1 seconds when the frequency is 47.0 Hertz; and
  • (f) at any frequencies between those specified in paragraphs (b) to (e) for times derived by linear interpolation.
• (2) If the inherent characteristics and design of a generator's generating unit are such that it is reasonably able to operate beyond the above requirements, the generator must declare such capabilities in accordance with clause 2(5) of Technical Code A of Schedule 8.3.
• (3) Each South Island generator must ensure that each of its assets, other than excluded generating units, remains synchronised, and can and do, at a minimum, sustain pre-event output―
  • (a) at all times when the frequency is above 47 Hertz; and
  • (b) for 30 seconds if the frequency falls below 47 Hertz but not below 45 Hertz.
• (4) The HVDC owner must at all times ensure that, while electrically connected, its assets contribute to supporting frequency during an under-frequency event in either island by―
  • (a) remaining electrically connected to those assets making up the grid in the North Island and South Island while the frequency in both islands remains above 48 Hertz; and
  • (b) remaining electrically connected to those assets making up the grid in the North Island and South Island while the frequency in both islands remains below 48 Hertz and above 47 Hertz for 90 seconds; and
  • (c) remaining electrically connected to those assets making up the grid in the North Island and South Island while the frequency in both islands remains above 45 Hertz for 35 seconds, unless the frequency in either island is less than 46.5 Hertz and the frequency is falling at a rate of 7 Hertz per second or greater; and
  • (d) subject to the level of transfer and the HVDC link configuration at the beginning of the under-frequency event, if the HVDC link itself is not the cause of the under-frequency event, modifying the instantaneous transfer on the HVDC link by up to 250 MW with the objective of limiting the difference between the North Island and South Island frequencies to no greater than 0.2 Hertz.
• (5) Each North Island connected asset owner and each South Island grid owner must ensure that it has established and maintained automatic under-frequency load shedding in block sizes and with relay settings in accordance with the technical codes.
• (6) For the purposes of subclause (5), the owner or operator of an energy storage system with a capacity equal to or greater than the threshold in clause 8.21(1) is not considered a connected asset owner in relation to that energy storage system.

• Each grid owner must ensure that its assets are capable of being operated, and operate, within the frequency targets set out in clause 7.2A.

• (1) For the purposes of clauses 8.17, 8.19, 8.25D, and the provisions in Technical Code A of Schedule 8.3 relating to the obligations of asset owners in respect of frequency, an excluded generating station means a generating station that exports less than 30 MW to a local network or the grid, unless the Authority has issued a direction under clause 8.38 that the generating station must comply with clauses 8.17, 8.19, 8.25A, and 8.25B and the relevant provisions in Technical Code A of Schedule 8.3.
• (2) Whether likely to be an excluded generating station or not, a generator who is planning to connect to the grid or a local network a generating unit with rated net maximum capacity equal to or greater than 1 MW (alternating current (a.c.) capacity) must provide the system operator with written advice of its intention to connect together with other information relating to that generating unit in accordance with clause 8.25(4).

• (1) Each grid owner must ensure that its assets at and in between―
  • (a) the high voltage terminals of the grid owner's transformers at each grid injection point and grid exit point; or
  • (b) if no transformer exists, the relevant grid injection point or grid exit point― are capable of being operated within the following range of voltages:

• (2) Each generator with a point of connection to the grid must at all times ensure that its assets are capable of being operated, and do operate, when the grid is operated within the range of voltages set out in subclause (1).
• (3) Each connected asset owner must ensure that its local network is capable of being operated, and does operate, when the grid is operated over the range of voltages set out in subclause (1).

• Each generator with a point of connection to the grid must at all times ensure that its assets―
  • (a) when the voltage at its grid injection point is within the applicable range of nominal voltage, are capable of exporting (over excited) when synchronised and made available for dispatch by the system operator, a minimum net reactive power which is 50% of the maximum continuous MW output power as measured at the following generating unit terminals:

• • (b) when the voltage at its grid injection point is within the applicable range of nominal voltage, are capable of importing (under excited) when synchronised and made available for dispatch by the system operator, a minimum net reactive power which is 33% of the maximum continuous MW output power as measured at the generating unit terminals as set out below:

• • (c) when synchronised, continuously operate in a manner that supports voltage and voltage stability on the grid in compliance with the technical codes.

• (1) If it is not possible for a connected asset owner to comply with subclause (2), the grid owner must, if possible, establish load shedding in block sizes and at voltage levels (and, if automatic systems are established, with relay settings) set out in the technical codes or otherwise as the system operator reasonably requires.
• (2) In order to prevent the collapse of the network voltage, each connected asset owner must ensure that, if possible, it has established load shedding in block sizes and at voltage levels (and, if automatic systems are established, with relay settings) in accordance with the technical codes or otherwise as the system operator reasonably requires.
• (3) For the purposes of subclause (2), the owner or operator of an energy storage system with a capacity equal to or greater than the threshold in clause 8.21(1) is not considered a connected asset owner in relation to that energy storage system.

• (1) Each grid owner must ensure that the design and configuration of its assets (including its connections to other persons) and associated protection arrangements are consistent with the technical codes and, in the reasonable opinion of the system operator, with maintaining the system operator’s ability to comply with the principal performance obligations. In reaching this opinion, the system operator must have regard to the potential impact of the design or configuration of those assets or associated protection arrangements on its compliance with the principal performance obligations and achievement of the dispatch objective.
• (2) Each grid owner and each connected asset owner must use reasonable endeavours to ensure that a generator who meets the following criteria provides the system operator with written advice of the existence of its generating unit and the generator’s name and address:
  • (a) the generator is directly connected to the grid owner's grid or directly or indirectly connected to the local network (as the case may be):
  • (b) the generator has a generating unit with a rated net maximum capacity equal to or greater than 1 MW.
• (3) Each asset owner and each purchaser must provide communication facilities that comply with the technical codes or otherwise, as the system operator reasonably requires, which must assist the system operator in planning to comply, and complying, with its principal performance obligations and achieving the dispatch objective.
• (4) Each asset owner and each purchaser must provide information that complies with the technical codes or otherwise as the system operator reasonably requests, to assist the system operator in planning to comply, and complying, with its principal performance obligations and achieving the dispatch objective.
• (5) If the system operator reasonably considers it necessary to assist the system operator in planning to comply, and complying, with the principal performance obligations and achieving the dispatch objective, the system operator―
  • (a) may require that an embedded generator provide information regarding the intended output of each embedded generating station greater than 10 MW in capacity, that must be either―
    • (i) submitted as an offer in accordance with subpart 1 of Part 13; or
    • (ii) provided in a form and manner agreed between the system operator and the embedded generator; and
  • (b) must advise the embedded generator of its requirement at least 20 business days in advance of the requirement coming into effect.
• (6) If the system operator reasonably considers it necessary to assist it in planning to comply, and complying, with the principal performance obligations and achieving the dispatch objective, the system operator may apply to the Authority to require an embedded generator to provide information regarding the intended output of a group of embedded generating stations that total greater than 10 MW in capacity and that are connected to the same grid exit point. If the Authority approves the system operator’s request, the information must be provided to the system operator by the relevant embedded generator in a form and manner determined by the Authority.

• (1) Each generator must ensure that each of its assets, when electrically connected to a network, is capable of remaining stable and electrically connected when the grid's lowest line-to-line voltage is within the no-trip zone shaded and marked "No-trip zone" in Figure 8.1 (for an asset in the North Island) or Figure 8.2 (for an asset in the South Island) for the period of 6 seconds immediately following the commencement of a zero impedance three-phase short circuit fault, or an unbalanced short circuit fault, on any part of the grid at 110 kV or 220 kV in the island in which the asset is connected.
• (2) Each generator must ensure that each of its assets, when electrically connected to a network, is capable of remaining stable and electrically connected when the highest line-to-line voltage at Haywards 220 kV bus (for an asset in the North Island) or Benmore 220 kV bus (for an asset in the South Island) is within the no-trip zone shaded and marked "No-trip zone" in Figure 8.3 for the period of 1 second immediately following the commencement of a trip of the HVDC link.
• (3) Whether a generator is complying with subclause (2) must be determined using power system analysis that uses—
  • (a) study cases provided by the relevant grid owner; and
  • (b) relevant system assumptions provided by the system operator.
• (4) A generator is not required to comply with subclause (1) in respect of an asset in the event of a fault of a type described in subclause (1) if the asset becomes isolated from the grid as a result of the fault.
• (5) A generating unit need not comply with subclause (1) to the extent that it is complying with a special protection scheme approved by the system operator.
• (6) The absolute grid voltage (per unit) shown on the Y axis of Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 is the ratio of grid lowest line-to-line voltage on a line to the nominal operating voltage of the line (that is, 110 kV or 220 kV).

• (1) Each generator must ensure that each of its generating units generates reactive current to oppose the change in its terminal voltage without exceeding the maximum transient reactive current specified in the generator's asset capability statement for the period of 6 seconds immediately following the commencement of a fault on the grid of a type described in clause 8.25A(1).
• (2) Each generator must ensure that each of its generating units provides active power output relative to pre-fault active power output at least in proportion to the grid voltage at the grid injection point for the period of 6 seconds immediately following the clearance of a fault on the grid of a type described in clause 8.25A(1).
• (3) Subclause (2) does not apply to a wind generating station if there has been a reduction in the intermittent wind power source during the 6 seconds following the commencement of the fault.

• A generator may comply with clause 8.25A in relation to a generating station by—
  • (a) ensuring that the performance of generating units that comprise the generating station comply; or
  • (b) installing additional equipment within the generating station; or
  • (c) a combination of the methods described in paragraphs (a) and (b).

• Clauses 8.25A and 8.25B do not apply—
  • (a) to a wind generating station when it operates at less than 5% of rated MW; or
  • (b) to any asset at an excluded generating station.

• Each asset owner and each purchaser must co-operate with the system operator as may reasonably be required by the system operator in carrying out its functions.

• (1) To the extent possible, given the information made available by asset owners, the system operator must monitor, in the manner set out in the policy statement, the ongoing compliance of asset owners with the asset owner performance obligations and the technical codes. To avoid doubt, the system operator has no monitoring obligations under this subpart other than those set out in the policy statement.
• (2) The system operator has a discretion to not dispatch an asset or configuration of assets, if it is not satisfied that the assets or configuration of assets comply with the relevant asset owner performance obligations or provisions of the technical codes, or that the asset owner has and is complying with a valid equivalence arrangement or dispensation from the relevant asset owner performance obligations or provisions of the technical codes.
• (3) The system operator must immediately advise an asset owner if the system operator has reasonable grounds to believe that the asset owner is not complying with an asset owner performance obligation, equivalence arrangement or dispensation, and that the asset owner—
  • (a) does not have a valid equivalence arrangement or dispensation from the relevant asset owner performance obligations or provisions of the technical codes: or
  • (b) is not complying with a valid equivalence arrangement or dispensation from the relevant asset owner performance obligations or provisions of the technical codes.

• (1) Each asset owner must comply with the asset owner performance obligations and technical codes at all times and must satisfy the system operator, whenever requested by the system operator acting reasonably, that each of its assets or configuration of assets complies with the asset owner performance obligations and technical codes that apply to that assets or configuration of assets.
• (2) If the system operator advises an asset owner under clause 8.27(3), the asset owner must co-operate with the system operator and use reasonable endeavours to restore compliance as soon as practicable.
• (3) During a period of commissioning or testing of assets, the asset owner performance obligations and technical codes do not apply to the asset owner in respect of the assets, if―
  • (a) the obligations that do not apply to the asset owner are specified in the agreed commissioning plan or testing plan; and
  • (b) during the period of non-compliance the asset owner complies with a commissioning plan or testing plan (as appropriate) agreed with the system operator; and
  • (c) the period of non-compliance is no longer than the agreed commissioning plan or testing plan; and
  • (d) subject to subclause (4), if an asset owner during a period of non-compliance meets the requirements of paragraphs (a) to (c), neither the asset owner nor the system operator is liable under this Code in relation to the non-compliance, except that the asset owner is not relieved of liability in the case of a negligent act or omission by the asset owner.
• (4) During any period of non-compliance, the non-compliant asset owner must pay the readily identifiable and quantifiable costs associated with its non-compliance, including the costs of the system operator purchasing additional ancillary services required as a consequence of its non-compliance.

• (1) Subject to subclause (2), if an asset owner cannot comply with an AOPO or a technical code obligation in respect of a particular asset or configuration of assets, being an existing, new or proposed asset, the asset owner may apply for an equivalence arrangement to be approved or dispensation to be granted in accordance with Schedule 8.1.
• (2) The system operator may not grant a dispensation in relation to an obligation to provide automatic under-frequency load shedding under clause 8.19(5) or Schedule 8.3, Technical Code B, clause 7.

• The system operator must approve an equivalence arrangement if it has received satisfactory evidence that the asset owner will put in place on the agreed date technical or commercial arrangements that will, in the reasonable opinion of the system operator, achieve compliance with the AOPO or technical code for which the equivalence arrangement is sought, even if the assets or configuration of assets do not strictly comply.

• (1) Subject to subclause (1A), the system operator must grant a dispensation to an asset owner who has or will have assets or a configuration of assets that do not comply with either an AOPO or technical code if the system operator has a reasonable expectation that it can continue to operate the existing system and meet its principal performance obligations and if the system operator can readily quantify the costs on other persons of that dispensation, despite the non-compliance of the assets, but―
  • (a) if the approval of a dispensation could impose readily identifiable and quantifiable costs on other persons, a condition of the dispensation must be that the asset owner is liable to pay the system operator for those costs, including the costs of the system operator purchasing any other ancillary services required as a consequence of its dispensation; and
  • (b) the asset owner must acknowledge that the granting of a dispensation does not guarantee that the system operator will dispatch that asset for which the dispensation was granted, as dispatch will only occur in accordance with the dispatch objective; and
  • (c) if the dispensation is a generating unit dispensation from clause 8.19(1) or (3), the generator must be allocated the following costs in a relevant trading period with respect to paragraph (a) for each of fast instantaneous reserves or sustained instantaneous reserves:

• (1A) If the system operator grants a dispensation from clause 8.25A or clause 8.25B to an asset owner under subclause (1), and the granting of the dispensation could impose readily identifiable and quantifiable costs on any other person, the system operator must not impose a condition on the asset owner in accordance with subclause (1)(a) that has effect earlier than 24 November 2018.
• (2) The system operator may impose other reasonable conditions on the grant of a dispensation under subclause (1), including conditions as to duration of the dispensation.

• Pending determination of an asset owner’s application for a dispensation or an equivalence arrangement, if the asset does not comply with the AOPOs or the technical codes, the asset owner is liable for the non-compliance and is responsible for additional costs incurred by the system operator or asset owners as a result of the non-compliance, including the costs of the system operator purchasing other ancillary services as a consequence of the non-compliance.

• An asset owner may apply to the system operator for a modification to an equivalence arrangement or dispensation, in which case clauses 8.34 to 8.36 and Schedule 8.1 apply.

• (1) An asset owner may at any time give written notice to the system operator for an equivalence arrangement or a dispensation to be cancelled on the grounds that the asset or configuration of assets subject to the equivalence arrangement or dispensation complies with AOPOs or technical codes.
• (2) A cancellation takes effect on the date specified in the notice as being the date the system operator accepted the cancellation.
• (3) The system operator must record the cancellation in the system operator register no later than 5 days after receiving the notice.

• (1) The system operator may revoke approval of an equivalence arrangement or revoke or vary the grant of a dispensation as the system operator reasonably considers appropriate if, at any time after the system operator has approved an equivalence arrangement or granted a dispensation, the system operator is satisfied that 1 or more of the following apply:
  • (a) the dispensation or equivalence arrangement was approved on information that was false or materially misleading:
  • (b) a prerequisite of the dispensation or equivalence arrangement has changed:
  • (c) a condition on which the dispensation or equivalence arrangement was approved has not been complied with:
  • (d) withdrawal is provided for under the terms of the dispensation granted:
  • (e) a change to this Code has occurred that affects the dispensation or equivalence arrangement:
  • (f) a decision has been reconsidered at the direction of the Rulings Panel under clause 8.36(4).
• (2) The system operator must not revoke or amend a dispensation or grant a further dispensation or revoke its approval of an equivalence arrangement under subclause (1), unless―
  • (a) the asset owner to whom the dispensation was granted, or for whom an equivalence arrangement was approved, and any other person who in the opinion of the system operator is likely to have an interest in the matter, is given reasonable notice of the system operator’s intentions and a reasonable opportunity to make submissions to the system operator on the issue; and
  • (b) the system operator has had regard to the submissions.

• (1) A participant may appeal a decision of the system operator in relation to an application for dispensation or equivalence arrangements on the grounds set out in subclause (3).
• (2) An appeal must be made to the Rulings Panel by giving written notice to the Authority specifying the grounds of appeal. A notice must be given no later than 10 business days after publication of the relevant decision in the system operator register under clause 8 of Schedule 8.1.
• (3) For the purposes of subclause (2), an appeal may be made on the grounds that―
  • (a) the system operator made an error of fact or failed to take into account all relevant information or took into account irrelevant information and such error, failure or irrelevancy was material to the decision; or
  • (b) the conditions imposed on the dispensation or equivalence arrangement are unjustifiably onerous, unnecessary or impose extra costs if appropriate alternatives exist.
• (4) The Rulings Panel, in determining an appeal, must approve the decision of the system operator or direct the system operator to reconsider the decision in full or by reference to specified matters.
• (5) Pending the outcome of an appeal, the decision of the system operator in relation to the grant of a dispensation or approval of an equivalence arrangement remains valid and may be relied upon by the relevant asset owner.

• (1) An asset owner who obtains approval for an equivalence arrangement must comply with its obligations under that arrangement.
• (1A) An asset owner who is granted a dispensation must comply with its obligations under that dispensation.
• (2) An equivalence arrangement and a dispensation are specific to an asset owner, and no approval of an equivalence arrangement or granting of a dispensation creates a precedent for the approval of other equivalence arrangements or dispensations.
• (3) The owner or operator of an asset or configuration of assets must advise the system operator if the owner or operator believes that it is in breach of a condition of its dispensation or equivalence arrangement or that the asset or configuration of assets, including any equivalence arrangement, does not, or is likely not to, comply with the asset owner performance obligations and technical codes.
• (4) If an asset owner fails to put in place, maintain and meet all requirements of an approved equivalence arrangement or dispensation, the asset owner is in breach of this Code.

• (1) Despite clauses 8.17, 8.19, and 8.25D, the system operator may, at any time, apply to the Authority for the Authority to issue a directive that an excluded generating station asset must comply with clauses 8.17, 8.19, 8.25A, and 8.25B, and the provisions of the technical codes (or parts thereof).
• (2) The Authority must issue the directive referred to in subclause (1) if the Authority is satisfied that there is a benefit to the public in obtaining compliance.
• (3) If a directive is issued under subclause (2), the owner of the excluded generating station asset must comply with the directive with effect from the date specified in the directive.

• This subpart provides for―
  • (a) a procurement plan that the system operator must use reasonable endeavours to implement and comply with; and
  • (b) the review of the procurement plan; and
  • (c) alternative ancillary service arrangements; and
  • (d) how ancillary services are to be priced and measured; and
  • (e) identifying the allocable costs for ancillary services and the regime by which those costs are allocated to affected parties.

• The system operator must use reasonable endeavours to both implement and comply with the procurement plan.

• (1) The procurement plan is incorporated by reference in this Code.
• (2) Clauses 7.13 to 7.22 apply to any amendment or replacement of the procurement plan.

• A procurement plan must, for each ancillary service―
  • (a) specify the principles that the system operator must apply in making a net purchase quantity assessment, which must include―
    • (i) determining the requirements for complying with the principal performance obligations; and
    • (ii) determining the requirements for achieving the dispatch objective; and
    • (iii) assessing the contribution that compliance by asset owners with the asset owner performance obligations will make towards the system operator’s compliance with the principal performance obligations; and
    • (iv) assessing the impact that dispensations and alternative ancillary service arrangements held by asset owners will have on the quantity of ancillary services required to enable the system operator to comply with the principal performance obligations; and
  • (b) contain a methodology for conducting a net purchase quantity assessment for each relevant ancillary service; and
  • (c) outline the process that the system operator must use to procure that ancillary service, taking into account that the system operator must use―
    • (i) market mechanisms to procure ancillary services wherever technology and transaction costs make this practicable and efficient; and
    • (ii) transparent processes that encourage all potential providers to compete to supply ancillary services required to meet common quality standards at the best economic cost; and
  • (d) specify the administrative costs for that ancillary service as proposed in the procurement plan; and
  • (e) outline the system operator’s technical requirements and key contract terms to support the procurement plan; and
  • (f) outline the rights and obligations of the system operator in relation to procurement of that ancillary service in circumstances not anticipated by the procurement plan, and if the assumptions made by the system operator in the procurement plan cannot be met; and
  • (g) outline how the system operator will report on progress in implementing the procurement plan.

• (1) The system operator must use reasonable endeavours to implement the procurement plan for each ancillary service by entering into contracts with the ancillary service agents in the manner specified in the procurement plan.
• (2) The system operator is the principal in any contract it enters into with an ancillary service agent.
• (3) If the system operator has entered into a contract, the system operator must use reasonable endeavours to ensure that the ancillary service agent complies with its contractual obligations, but the system operator is not otherwise liable in respect of any failure by an ancillary service agent to comply with such obligations.

• The system operator must make the net purchase quantity assessment for each relevant ancillary service using the methodology in the procurement plan and publish the results of the assessment as soon as practicable.

• (1) The system operator may depart from the processes and arrangements set out in the procurement plan if the system operator reasonably considers it necessary to do so to comply with the principal performance obligations.
• (2) When the system operator makes a departure under subclause (1), the system operator must provide a report to the Authority setting out the circumstances of the departure and the actions taken to deal with it.
• (3) The Authority must publish the report within a reasonable time after receiving it.

• (1) If an asset owner wishes to have an alternative ancillary service arrangement authorised by the system operator, that asset owner (or, if more than 1 asset owner wishes to have an authorisation, those asset owners jointly) may apply to the system operator to have that arrangement authorised as an alternative ancillary service arrangement using the process set out in Schedule 8.2.
• (2) The system operator must authorise the arrangement as an alternative ancillary service arrangement if―
  • (a) the proposed arrangement complies with the technical requirements for that ancillary service as set out in the current procurement plan; and
  • (b) the implementation of the proposed arrangement will make the ancillary service available for dispatch by the system operator in substantially the same manner as if the ancillary service had been procured in accordance with the procurement plan.
• (3) As a condition of authorising an alternative ancillary service arrangement under subclause (2), the system operator may do 1 or more of the following:
  • (a) require the asset owner to enter into arrangements with the system operator to ensure that the system operator can continue to meet the principal performance obligations:
  • (b) specify the date on which the alternative ancillary service arrangement commences:
  • (c) impose any other condition it reasonably believes is necessary, including conditions necessary for the system operator to meet its principal performance obligations and conditions necessary for the orderly reconciliation and settlement of ancillary services.

• (1) An asset owner may at any time give written reasonable notice to the system operator of suspension of the alternative ancillary service arrangement for a period specified in the notice.
• (2) The system operator may suspend an alternative ancillary service arrangement in a system security situation.

• An asset owner may apply to the system operator for a modification to an alternative ancillary service arrangement in which case clauses 8.51 to 8.53 and Schedule 8.2 apply.

• An asset owner may at any time give reasonable notice in writing to the system operator of cancellation of the alternative ancillary service arrangement, which comes into effect on the date specified in the notice.

• (1) The system operator may revoke authorisation of the alternative ancillary service arrangement as the system operator reasonably considers appropriate, if at any time after the system operator has authorised an alternative ancillary service arrangement, the system operator is satisfied that 1 or more of the following factors apply:
  • (a) the alternative ancillary service arrangement was authorised on information that was false or materially misleading:
  • (b) a prerequisite of the alternative ancillary service arrangement has changed:
  • (c) a condition upon which the authorisation was granted has not been complied with:
  • (d) such revocation is provided for under the terms of the authorisation.
• (2) Subject to clause 8.49(2), the system operator must not revoke or amend an alternative ancillary service arrangement unless—
  • (a) the person to whom the authorisation was granted and any other person who, in the opinion of the system operator, is likely to have an interest in the matter, is given reasonable notice of the system operator’s intentions and a reasonable opportunity to make submissions to the system operator; and
  • (b) the system operator has had regard to those submissions.

• (1) An applicant may appeal any decision of the system operator in relation to any alternative ancillary service arrangement.
• (2) A participant may appeal any decision of the system operator in relation to an alternative ancillary service arrangement on the grounds set out in subclause (4).
• (3) An appeal must be commenced with the Rulings Panel by giving written notice to the Authority, specifying the grounds of appeal. A notice must be given within 10 business days of publication of the decision in the system operator register under clause 4 of Schedule 8.2.
• (4) For the purpose of subclause (2), an appeal may be made on the grounds that―
  • (a) the system operator made an error of fact, or failed to take properly into account all relevant information or took into account irrelevant information, and such error, failure or irrelevancy was material to the decision; or
  • (b) the conditions imposed on the alternative ancillary service arrangement are onerous, unnecessary or impose extra costs if appropriate alternatives exist.
• (5) The Rulings Panel, in determining an appeal, must either approve the decision of the system operator or direct the system operator to reconsider the decision in full or by reference to specified matters.
• (6) Pending the outcome of an appeal, the decision of the system operator in relation to the authorisation of an alternative ancillary service arrangement remains valid and can be acted upon by the relevant asset owner.

• (1) The system operator must monitor the performance of alternative ancillary service arrangements in accordance with the procurement plan and the monitoring regimes specified in the respective alternative ancillary service arrangements. If the system operator considers, on reasonable grounds, that an alternative ancillary service arrangement is not being, or likely not to be, complied with, the system operator must immediately advise the asset owner.
• (2) An asset owner who obtains an authorisation of an alternative ancillary service arrangement must comply with its obligations under the arrangement. If the system operator advises an asset owner under subclause (1), the asset owner must co-operate with the system operator and must immediately use reasonable endeavours to restore compliance as soon as possible.
• (3) An asset owner who holds an alternative ancillary service arrangement is relieved of an obligation to pay costs for ancillary service in the manner provided for in clauses 8.55 to 8.59 and 8.64 to 8.70 to the extent provided for in the alternative ancillary service arrangement.
• (4) The holder of an alternative ancillary service arrangement breaches this Code if ancillary services are not made available to the system operator in accordance with the alternative ancillary service arrangement, or if an alternative ancillary service arrangement fails. From the date a breach of an alternative ancillary service arrangement becomes known, the holder of the alternative ancillary service arrangement must meet its share of the ancillary costs as if the alternative ancillary service arrangement had not been authorised.

• This subpart provides for the provision of information relating to interruptible load.

• (1) The system operator must maintain and publish an up to date copy of the system operator register.
• (2) The up to date copy of the system operator register published under subclause (1) must be available to the public at all times up until a new up to date copy is published.

• (1) Each ancillary service agent that contracts for interruptible load in a network must, within 10 business days of entering into the contract, give the following participants the information in subclause (2):
  • (a) if the interruptible load is contracted on a local network, the connected asset owner that operates the local network:
  • (b) if the interruptible load is contracted on an embedded network, the connected asset owner that operates the local network to which the embedded network is connected:
  • (c) if the interruptible load is contracted on the grid, the grid owner that owns or operates the part of the grid on which the interruptible load is contracted.
• (2) The information required is—
  • (a) a list of the ICPs to which the contract relates; and
  • (b) the maximum MW that can be interrupted under the contract; and
  • (c) the commencement and expiry dates of the contract.
• (3) If an ancillary service agent has given a connected asset owner or grid owner information under subclause (1), the connected asset owner or grid owner may require the ancillary service agent to provide further information about the interruptible load to which the contract relates.
• (4) An ancillary service agent must comply with a requirement under subclause (3).

• This subpart provides for the allocation of costs relating to ancillary services.

• (1) The allocable costs for each ancillary service are―
  • (a) the actual amounts that the ancillary service agents are entitled to receive for that ancillary service under contracts entered into by the system operator in implementing the procurement plan; plus
  • (b) the actual administrative costs of the system operator (as approved by the Authority) incurred in administering the procurement plan in respect of that ancillary service; less
  • (c) any readily identifiable and quantifiable costs to be paid by asset owners in respect of that ancillary service as a condition of any dispensations stipulated in accordance with clause 8.31(1)(a); less
  • (d) any identifiable costs to be paid by any person in respect of that ancillary service, as a condition of any agreement reached by the system operator, in accordance with clause 8.6.
• (2) [Revoked]

• The allocable cost of black start must be paid by the registered participants who are grid owners to the system operator in accordance with the process described in clause 8.68. If there are multiple grid owners, those costs must be allocated between them in proportion to their respective ODV valuations.

• The allocable cost of over frequency reserve must be paid by the HVDC owner to the system operator in accordance with the process described in clause 8.68.

• The allocable cost of frequency keeping must be paid by purchasers to the system operator in accordance with the process in clause 8.68. Those costs must be calculated in accordance with the following formula:

• The availability costs in a billing period must be allocated separately to persons in the North Island and South Island in accordance with the following formula:

• (1) The system operator must promptly advise the Authority and every participant substantially affected by an under-frequency event, that an under-frequency event has occurred.
• (2) The system operator may, by notice in writing to a participant, require a participant to provide information required by the system operator for the purposes of this clause.
• (3) A notice given under subclause (2) must specify the information required by the system operator and the date by which the information must be provided (which must not be earlier than 20 business days after the notice is given).
• (4) A participant who has received a notice under subclause (2) must provide the information required by the system operator by the date specified by the system operator in the notice.
• (5) Within 40 business days of receiving the information, or such longer period as may be agreed by the Authority, the system operator must provide a report to the Authority that includes the following:
  • (a) whether, in the system operator's view, the under-frequency event was caused by a participant and if so, the identity of the causer:
  • (b) the reasons for the system operator's view:
  • (c) all of the information the system operator considered in reaching its view.

• (1) The Authority must determine whether an under-frequency event has been caused by a participant and, if so, the identity of the causer.
• (2) In circumstances where the causer of an under-frequency event is not identified in the system operator’s report, or the alleged causer as identified in the system operator’s report denies it is the causer, the Authority must publish a draft determination that states whether the under-frequency event was caused by a participant and, if so, the identity of the causer.
• (2A) In circumstances where the causer of an under-frequency event is identified in the system operator’s report and the alleged causer accepts it is the causer, the Authority must provide a draft determination, for comment, to the causer that states the identity of the causer, but is not required to publish the draft determination or otherwise consult on the draft determination under subclause (4).
• (3) The Authority must give reasons for its findings in the draft determination.
• (4) The Authority must consult every participant substantially affected by an under-frequency event in relation to the draft determination.
• (5) When the Authority publishes the draft determination under subclause (2), the Authority must give notice to participants substantially affected by the under-frequency event of the closing date for submissions on the draft determination.
• (6) The date referred to in subclause (5) must be no earlier than 10 business days after the date of publication of the draft determination.
• (7) The Authority must publish submissions received under subclause (4) unless there is good reason for withholding information in a submission.
• (8) For the purposes of subclause (7), good reason for withholding information exists if there is good reason for withholding the information under the Official Information Act 1982.
• (9) Following the opportunity for comment under subclause (2A) or consultation under subclause (4), the Authority must publish a final determination.

• (1) A participant who is substantially affected by a determination may dispute the determination by referring the matter to the Rulings Panel.
• (2) A dispute is commenced by giving written notice to the Rulings Panel specifying the grounds of the dispute.
• (3) A notice under subclause (2) must be given within 10 business days after the determination is published.
• (4) The Authority’s determination is suspended if a dispute is referred to the Rulings Panel within that time.
• (5) If a dispute is not referred to the Rulings Panel within that time, the determination is final.
• (6) If a dispute is referred to the Rulings Panel, the Authority must provide the Rulings Panel with all information considered by the Authority in making the determination.

• (1) The Rulings Panel may—
  • (a) confirm the determination; or
  • (b) amend the determination; or
  • (c) substitute its own determination; or
  • (d) refer the determination back to the Authority with directions as to the particular matters that require reconsideration or amendment.
• (2) The Authority’s determination has effect as confirmed, amended, or substituted by the Rulings Panel from the date of the Rulings Panel’s decision.
• (3) The Rulings Panel must give a copy of its decision to the Authority as soon as reasonably practicable.
• (4) The Authority must publish the Rulings Panel’s decision as soon as reasonably practicable.
• (5) If the Rulings Panel refers the matter back to the Authority, the Authority must have regard to the Rulings Panel’s directions under subclause (1)(d).

• The event charge payable by the causer of an under-frequency event where the cause of the under-frequency event is an interruption to or reduction or electricity (referred to as “Event e” below) must be calculated in accordance with the following formula:

• The event charge payable by the causer of an under-frequency event where the cause of the under-frequency event is an increase in electricity demand (referred to as “Event e” below) must be calculated in accordance with the following formula:

• An event charge that has been paid for an under-frequency event (referred to as “Event e”) under clause 8.64 or under clause 8.64A must be rebated in accordance with the following formula to persons who are allocated availability costs in accordance with clause 8.59:

• All costs calculated in accordance with clauses 8.59, 8.64 and 8.64A are payable by the relevant participants to the system operator, and all event charge rebates calculated in accordance with clause 8.65 are payable by the system operator to the relevant participants, in accordance with clause 8.69.

• (1) Each connected asset owner must pay the allocable cost of voltage support in each zone to the system operator in accordance with clause 8.68. The costs must be calculated in accordance with this clause.
• (2) Each connected asset owner must pay a nominated peak kvar charge calculated in accordance with the following formula:

• (3) Each connected asset owner must pay a monthly peak penalty charge calculated in accordance with the following formula:

• (4) For the purpose of calculating the “kvar above nominated kvar” quantity, the kvar taken by the connected asset owner—
  • (a) includes only kvar demands on weekdays (Monday to Friday but excluding national holidays) between the hours of 0700 to 2100 inclusive; and
  • (b) includes no more than 2 kvar peaks in any 1 day; and
  • (c) is the average of the 6 largest kvar peaks for the connected asset owner in each month measured at the connected asset owner kvar reference node j within the zone z,—
• and “kvar above nominated kvar” is the difference between the kvar taken by the connected asset owners as determined in accordance with paragraphs (a) to (c) and the nominated kvar specified by the connected asset owner.
• (5) Each connected asset owner must pay a residual charge or receive a residual payment calculated in accordance with the following formulae:

• (6) For the purposes of this clause, a connected asset owner does not include a generator who is supplied electricity for consumption at a point of connection with the grid.

• (1) The clearing manager must determine the amount owing to the system operator by each grid owner, purchaser, generator and connected asset owner for ancillary services under clauses 8.55 to 8.67. On behalf of the system operator, the clearing manager must collect those amounts, and any amounts advised by the system operator as owing to it under clauses 8.6 and 8.31(1)(a), by including the relevant amounts in the amounts advised by the clearing manager as owing under Part 14.
• (2) To enable the clearing manager to determine those amounts, the system operator must provide to the clearing manager the total allocable cost for each ancillary service and any additional information required to carry out the calculations under clauses 8.55 to 8.67 that is not otherwise provided by the reconciliation manager under Part 13.
• (3) [Revoked]
• (4) [Revoked]
• (5) [Revoked]
• (6) All amounts owing under this clause are subject to the priority order of payments set out in clause 14.56.

• (1) The clearing manager must determine the following amounts owing as a result of washups under subpart 6 of Part 14:
  • (a) the amount owing to the system operator by each grid owner, purchaser, generator and connected asset owner for ancillary services under clauses 8.55 to 8.67:
  • (b) the amount owing to each grid owner, purchaser, generator and connected asset owner by the system operator for ancillary services under clauses 8.55 to 8.67:
  • (c) [Revoked]:
  • (d) [Revoked].
• (2) On behalf of the system operator the clearing manager must collect or pay the amounts owing for ancillary services, and any amounts advised by the system operator as payable to it under clauses 8.6 and 8.31(1)(a) by including the relevant amounts advised by the clearing manager as owing under Part 14.
• (3) To enable the clearing manager to determine the amounts payable for ancillary services, the system operator must provide to the clearing manager the allocable cost for each ancillary service and any additional information required to carry out the recalculations under clauses 8.55 to 8.67 that is not otherwise provided by the reconciliation manager under Part 13.
• (4) All amounts owing under this clause are subject to the priority order of payments set out in clause 14.56.

• (1) The system operator must pay each ancillary service agent the amounts that each ancillary service agent is entitled to receive for ancillary services under contracts entered into by the system operator in implementing the procurement plan.
• (2) The system operator must use the clearing manager as its agent to pay participants.